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The Discretionary Exception and Municipal
Tort Liability: A Reappraisal
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging early in the development of English law, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity was premised on the concept that
neither the king nor Parliament was capable of doing any
wrong.' The doctrine was later incorporated into American
law, many feel more by mistake than by conscious choice.2 To
accommodate a democratic form of government the premise was
advanced that the state shall not be compelled to defend itself
from assault in the courts of its own creation.3
Notwithstanding its long though checkered acceptance,4 the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has increasingly fallen subject to
attack by the courts5 and commentators.6 It has been argued
that the reasons which once justified governmental immunity
from suit have little or no relevance today, and that public policy
and popular sentiment now require that a government submit
to suit by its citizens for torts committed by its officers.7 In
1. Blachly & Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in
Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 LAw & CONTEmp. PaoB. 181, 182 (1942).
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1924).
2. 3 K. DAvis, ADMiNsmTV LAw TEAsisE § 25.01, at 438 (1958).
3. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907);
Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850); Blachly &
Oatman, supra note 1, at 188.
4. The courts, until recently, were generally reluctant to disturb
the doctrine. Judicial responsibility for sovereign immunity in tort goes
far beyond the original invention and elaboration of the immunity
doctrine. Even where legislative bodies become convinced that tort
sufferers should be allowed to sue the sovereign, and even when clear
and unequivocal statutes are enacted authorizing such suits, the courts
have frequently nullified such legislation by interpreting it to mean
that sovereign immunity must continue. Borchard, supra note 1, at 9;
Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Mli~N. L. REv. 751, 770
(1956). However, numerous methods of avoiding the effect of the doc-
trine were developed by both courts and legislatures. See K. DAVIs,
supra note 2, §§ 25.02-.05.
5. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955);
cases cited note 35 infra.
6. E.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1,
129, 229 (1924) (pts. 1-3), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926) (pts. 4-6),
28 COLumT. L. REV. 577, 734 (1928) (pts. 7-8); Fuller & Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Hiuv. L. REv. 437 (1941); James, Tort
Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
610 (1955); Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of
Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 214 (1942). But see
Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity,
36 So. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1963).
7. Borchard, supra note 1, at 6.
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response to this feeling, many jurisdictions have moved to re-
strict or eliminate sovereign immunity.8
Prior to 1962, the Minnesota courts struggled with this doc-
trine. In that year the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Spanel v.
Mounds View School District,9 prospectively overruled the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity as applied to state subdivisions,
on the condition, however, that the state legislature not act to
the contrary by the end of the legislative session in 1963.10 In
apparent response to this pronouncement, the Minnesota legisla-
ture enacted chapter 466 of the Minnesota Statutes, which sub-
jects municipalities," though not the state itself, to tort liabil-
ity.12
Both the Federal Tort Claims Act,13 enacted in 1946, and the
Minnesota statute, modeled after the federal law, contain a num-
ber of exceptions. One exception common to both enactments is
immunity for discretionary functions or duties.14 The Minne-
8. Most of such movement has been the result of action by the
courts. A good summary of such action may be found in K. DAvis, supra
note 2, § 25.01 (1965 Supp.). For a summary of the development in the
various states as of 1954, see Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the
States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1363, 1367 (1954).
9. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
10. Id. at 292, 118 N.W.2d at 803.
11. MiN. STAT. §§ 466.01-.17 (1965). This enactment includes
municipalities as defined in § 466.01, i.e., any city, village, borough,
county, town, public authority, public corporation, special district, school
district, or other political subdivision. As originally introduced, the
statute would have applied to the state as well as every municipality.
Senate File, No. 758, Minn. Senate (1963). However, the bill was
amended in committee and the state retained its original immunity.
12. There is a maximum limit of $300,000 for injuries arising out of
a single occurrence. MN. STAT. § 466.04 (1965).
The statute appears to apply to torts of all types: "... every
municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers,
employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function."
MrNX. STAT. § 466.02 (1965). However, other provisions of the enact-
ment specifically exempt torts based on workmen's compensation
claims, § 466.03(2), the assessment and collection of taxes, § 466.03(3),
and the accumulation of snow or ice on highways or other public
property, unless it is affirmatively caused by the negligence of the
municipality, § 466.03(4).
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964), the
federal government has been held to be subject to absolute liability.
United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
934 (1954). The language of the Minnesota statute contains no implica-
tion that liability will be imposed only in the case of intentional or
negligent torts. Therefore, municipalities will probably be subjected to
absolute liability also.
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964).
14. MmNw. STAT. § 466.03(6) (1965); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
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sota statute provides that every municipality is immune from
liability on "[a]ny claim based upon the performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty,
whether or not the discretion is abused."'15 The term "discre-
tionary function or duty" is not defined in either statute16 and,
while there are numerous cases interpreting this exception
under federal law,17 the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet
spoken.'8
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the applicability
of the discretionary exception to the area of municipal tort lia-
bility. The interests of government in being free from liability,
in certain instances, will be balanced against a strong public
policy, implicit in the passage of the statute, toward compen-
sating members of society who fall victim to governmental torts.
It will be argued that the standard which has been developed
in federal case law, for application to the federal government, is
an inappropriate tool for balancing the various interests in-
volved at the municipal level. Finally, it will be argued that
the tests utilized to determine the initial existence of a tort
will provide sufficient protection to government at the munici-
pal level and that, therefore, the discretionary duty exception is
unnecessary in a statute covering municipal tort liability.
Moreover, if some protection of certain types of municipal deci-
sions is deemed necessary, it will be shown that this can be ac-
complished through the use of specific statutory exemptions,
thus avoiding the amphiboly' 9 of "discretionary function or
duty."
15. rmT. STAT. § 466.03 (6) (1965).
16. However, the Minnesota legislature felt it necessary to spe-
cifically exclude liability based on "... an act or omission of an officer
or employee, exercising due care, in the execution of a valid or invalid
statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or regulation." MINN. STAT.
§ 466.03(5) (1965). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act which con-
tains both the exception above for federal officers and the discretionary
exceptions within one subsection, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1964), courts have
held that this refers to a statutory direction to do a specific thing but
not the statutory grant of power to exercise discretion. Compare Som-
erset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951), with
Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
17. See Section V infra.
18. A recent Minnesota Attorney General's Opinion, however, has
held that the issuance of a building permit by a city engineer is a
discretionary act. Op. MIN. ATTY GEN. 590-32(6A) (1965).
19. The author deems this clause an amphiboly because it not
only encompasses a contradiction in terms, see Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1016,
1020 (1965), but is also gramatically imprecise. See note 100 infra.
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II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of the Minnesota statute, the sover-
eign immunity enjoyed by the state had been extended in a re-
stricted fashion to the local governing units. 20 This incomplete
extension of sovereign immunity results from a distinction be-
tween municipal corporations and quasi-municipal corporations.
A municipal corporation, such as a city or village, may be de-
scribed as a "legal institution . . . established . . .primarily to
regulate the local or internal affairs of the territory ....
and secondarily, to share in the civil government of the state in
the particular locality.121 On the other hand, a quasi-corpora-
tion, such as a county, town, school district, or the like is treated
as an agency of the state22 established for the purpose of fa-
cilitating the administration of state power or authority at the
local level.23
Since quasi-corporations are viewed as rather direct exten-
sions of the state government, they are generally given immun-
ity coextensive with that enjoyed by the state.24 Municipal cor-
porations, however, have been allowed to participate in the
state's sovereign immunity in only a limited number of situa-
tions. 25 These latter governmental units are viewed as pos-
sessing a dual character. On the one hand, the municipal cor-
poration has subordinate legislative powers which have been del-
egated by and are exercised on behalf of the state.26 When injury
results from an exercise of these "public" or "governmental"
functions, there is no logical reason for imposing liability when
the state itself would not be held similarly responsible. 27 In
20. See, e.g., Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d
254 (1953).
21. 1 E. McQUILAN, MuNicnCPAL CoiPORATIONS § 126, at 365 (2d ed.
1937) [hereinafter cited as McQu-LLAN].
22. 6 McQuLLAN § 2775, at 1018-2:1.
23. It should be noted that the Minnesota statute groups all of the
above described governing bodies under the term "municipal corpora-
tions." See note 11 supra.
24. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Sherburne County, 227 Minn. 132, 34
N.W.2d 342 (1948); cases cited in 6 McQumLAN § 2775, at 1021.
25. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254
(1953); Blachly & Oatman, supra note 1, at 189; Fuller & Casner, supra
note 6. For an argument against distinguishing between the two classifi-
cations of local governmental entities see J. FORDHAM, LocAL GovwmN-
MENT LAW 16 (1949).
26. See, e.g., Thiede v. Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d
400 (1944); cases cited in 1 McQuILLAN § 126, at 369.
27. 6 McQunLAN § 2775, at 1021. See, e.g., Lauxman v. Tisher,
213 Iowa 654, 239 N.W. 675 (1931); Baty v. Binghamton, 141 Misc. 127,
252 N.Y.S. 263 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Lindemann v. Kenosha, 206 Wis. 364,
240 N.W. 373 (1932).
[Vol. 52:10471050
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this capacity the municipal corporation is identical to the quasi-
municipal corporation. On the other hand, a municipal corpora-
tion has functions which are performed not as a mere agent of
the state, but in its more independent nature as a corporation
serving local inhabitants. 28 Thus, where a municipal corpora-
tion is involved in activities which are characterized as private or
corporate,29 commercial or profitmaking,3 0 or of benefit primarily
to the locality and its inhabitants,31 the courts have not ex-
tended governmental immunity.32
While the above distinction has a look of certainty, there
has been wide variation in the treatment of activities which
appear to be identical. Functions held to be governmental in
one jurisdiction are viewed as nongovernmental in others,33 and
the whole area is fraught with confusion and ambiguity.34 Thus,
the courts in many jurisdictions have abandoned this distinction
in favor of totally abolishing sovereign immunity for municipal
corporations.3 5
However, the courts have resorted to a different distinction
in cases determining the scope of liability of government officials.
They have been held immune from tort liability for acts found to
28. In re Northern Bank, 85 Misc. 594, 148 N.Y.S. 70 (Sup. Ct.
1914).
29. E.g., Tillman v. District of Columbia, 58 App. D.C. 242, 29 F.2d
442 (1928); Roumbos v. Chicago, 332 fI1. 70, 163 N.E. 361 (1928).
30. E.g., Davoust v. Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 84 P. 760 (1906) (main-
taining an electric plant); Savannah v. Spalding Constr. Co., 29 Ga.
App. 792, 116 S.E. 346 (1922) (marking property boundaries and receiv-
ing consideration therefor).
31. E.g., Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 50 Am. R. 517 (1884).
32. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254
(1953); see generally 6 McQuILLAN §§ 2792-822.
33. See 6 McQuiL&T § 2792, at 1040. The distinction is probably
one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law for it has caused con-
fusion not only among the various jurisdictions but almost always
within each jurisdiction. Davis, supra note 4, at 774. See Indian Tow-
ing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S 61, 65 (1955); Brush v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 352, 362 (1937).
34. See Blachly & Oatman, supra note 1, at 190; Kennedy & Lynch,
supra note 6, at 166; Lawton, Disintegration of Governmental Immunity,
30 INs. COUNSEL J. 251, 252 (1963); Comment, 36 WASH. L. REv. 312, 316
(1961).
35. E.g., Stone v. State Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d
107 (1963); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Hargrove v. Town of Coca Beach, 96 So. 2d
130 (Fla. 1957); Kamau & Cushnie v. Hawaii County, 41 Hawaii 527(1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d
1 (1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962). For a complete and recent presentation of the judicial activity
in the various states, see 3 K. DAvis, supra note 2, § 25.01 (1966 Supp.).
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be "discretionary, 3 6 while liability has been imposed for acts
found to be "ministerial '3 7 or "mandatory."38  However, at-
tempts to define what constitutes a "discretionary" act for the
purposes of determining an officer's liability, have resulted in
no more consistency than the proprietary-governmental distinc-
tion. 3
9
III. THE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS UNDERLYING THE
DISCRETIONARY DUTY EXCEPTION
Since 1946 the federal courts have been faced with the prob-
lem of interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act 40 and its excep-
tion for discretionary functions or duties.41 In seeking to under-
stand and evaluate the discretionary duty exception the follow-
ing considerations must be looked to: the statutory meaning of
discretion, the concern for the effect of liability on the official,
and the maintenance of the separation of powers.
Regarding the meaning of "discretion" itself, the legislative
history of the federal discretionary exception, along with the
exception for "claims based upon the act or omission of a
Government employee exercising due care in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not valid . . . ," which is con-
tained in the same section, consists basically of one, often re-
peated, paragraph.
... This is a highly important exception, intended to preclude
any possibility that the bill might be construed to authorize suit
for damages against the Government; growing out of an author-
ized activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where
no negligence on the part of any Government agent is shown,
and the only ground for suit is the contention that the same
conduct by a private individual would be tortious, or that the
statute or regulation authorizing the project was invalid. It is
also designed to preclude application of the bill to a claim
against a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Trade Commis-
36. E.g., Taylor v. Manson, 9 Cal. App. 382, 99 P. 410 (1908);
Hodgdon v. Moulton, 207 Mass. 445, 93 N.E. 656 (1911).
37. E.g., Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Ass'n, 118 Conn. 307, 172
A. 220 (1934); State v. Harper, 166 Wis. 303, 165 N.W. 281 (1917).
38. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Filer, :07 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204 (1933).
See generally Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage
Actions, 77 HARv. L. REV. 209, 218 (1963); Jennings, Tort Liability of
Administrative Officers, 21 Mum. L. REv. 263 (1937).
39. E.g., compare Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill. 272, 115 N.E. 393
(1917) (duties of the auditor and treasurer in issuing and paying war-
rants are purely ministerial), with Hicks v. Davis, 100 Kan. 4, 163 P. 799
(1917) (the functions of a state auditor are more than those of a mere
ministerial officer). See Jaffee, supra note 38.
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
[Vol. 52:10471052
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sion or the Securities and Exchange Commission, based upon an
alleged abuse of discretionary authority by an officer or em-
ployee, whether or not negligence is alleged to have been in-
volved. To take another example, claims based upon an al-
legedly negligent exercise by the Treasury Department of the
blacklisting or freezing powers are also intended to be excepted.
The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test
the validity of or provide a remedy on account of such dis-
cretionary acts even though negligently performed and involv-
ing an abuse of discretion. Nor is it desirable or intended that
the constitutionality of legislation, or the legality of a rule or
regulation should be tested through the medium of a damage
suit for tort. However, the common-law torts of employees of
regulatory agencies would be included within the scope of the
bill to the same extent as torts of nonregulatory agencies. 42
Since this statement uses the term "discretionary" several times,
it is of limited aid in defining that term. The examples and
general tenor of the paragraph give some indication that admin-
istrative decisions establishing governmental policy, or decisions
of a broad, general nature are not to be the basis of liability.
However, these things are a matter of degree and the problem is
to determine where the line should be drawn in a particular
case.
Generally speaking, every act involves some element of dis-
cretion as that term is commonly understood.43 However, it is
evident from the statute's sweeping imposition of liability that
the term "discretion" is not used in its common, broad sense,
but rather as a term of art used to include less than all deci-
sions. The discretionary duty exception differs from the older
tests of municipal liability in a rather basic manner. Under the
governmental-nongovernmental or corporate-proprietary tests of
municipal liability, the judicial focus was on the nature of the
activity out of which the injury in question arose.44 The court
would categorize the purpose for which the government was
acting and choose whether to impose liability or not, depending
on the categorization. 45 However, under the discretionary ex-
42. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942).
43. Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462,
468 (1920); see also Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 78
(1955) (suggesting that even a driver of a mail truck exercises discre-
tion as to how to drive); Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Offi-
cial Acts, 20 MicI. L. REv. 848, 854 (1922). Patterson also suggests that
every official act includes, broadly speaking, the interpretation of a
statute.
44. See Section 11 supra.
45. Many argue that the process is the reverse, the label being
applied after it has been determined whether or not liability should
obtain. ,See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 38, at 218.
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ception provision of the federal statute, analysis in terms of
the nature of the governmental activity involved was dropped. 46
Instead, the statute compels a focus on the nature of the deci-
sion involved. Thus, in determining governmental liability for
tort, the courts are faced with the task of identifying which
characteristics should control the classification of decisions as dis-
cretionary.
In addition to the foregoing, the courts must consider which
interests of government the discretionary exception was intended
to protect. One such interest of government requiring pro-
tection is the effective, unfettered performance of its officials.
In the past, the extension of tort immunity to governmental
officials has been based upon two considerations. First, it is felt
that an injustice results when an officer, under a duty to exer-
cise his judgment, is found liable when that judgment is er-
roneous. More important, however, is the pragmatic concern
that his consideration of potential liability, whether personal
or governmental, will interfere adversely with the officer's abil-
ity to exercise his judgment when needed.4 7 Although the
statutes with which this Note is concerned impose liability on the
government and not the official, there are circumstances in
which the imposition of liability upon the government may affect
the behavior of the official, thus leading to the same dangers
discussed above with regard to the consequences of direct lia-
bility of such officials. Because the liability of the government
is vicarious, stemming from the respondeat superior relationship
with its officials, governing bodies have, in the past, sometimes
been allowed indemnification from the official.48 Such indemni-
fication is consistent with the traditional theories of respondeat
superior. To the extent that indemnification is still permitted,
46. M1wN~. STAT. § 466.02 (1965) imposes liability for torts "whether
arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." Since 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 imposes liability "in the same manner and to the same intent as
a private individual under like circumstances," it has been argued that
the Federal Tort Liability Act was meant to exclude activities in
which only the government engages, and thus retained the govern-
mental-proprietary distinction. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955). However, this argument has been rejected. Id.
47. E.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
48. A negligent employee who commits a tortious act against a
third person (as well as one who looses or damages government prop-
erty of which he is in charge) commits a breach of his contract of
employment and, whether or not an action for indemnity would lie, an
action for breach of contract or for tort would lie. RESTATEMENT Or
AGENcY §§ 400, 401 (1933); Seavey, "Liberal Construction" and the
Tort Liability of the Federal Government, 67 HAv. L. Rnv. 994, 1002
(1954).
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the official's actions will be affected by considerations of personal
liability, and, a fortiori, government's ability to act is impeded
since it can act only through such officials. However, there has
been a trend away from indemnification of the government.49
In fact, legislation now often provides that governmental units
may or must indemnify'the official for liability to which he is
subjected as a result of his official duties.r0 In this situation the
official's decisions will not be affected by a concern for personal
liability. Nevertheless, it has been argued that a concern for his
reputation, rating, and a sense of responsibility to the govern-
ment may tend to have the same effect.51 Thus, although of
somewhat limited application, one reason for the discretionary
exception is that the danger of potential liability, through its
effect on officials, will indirectly hinder the effective operation
of government.
Another interest of government requiring protection is the
maintenance of the separation of powers. It is arguable that the
imposition of tort liability will have a direct effect on the govern-
ing process. For example, the official to whom the duty to make
a particular decision has been entrusted often has a special ex-
pertise to make that decision. He may also have access to in-
formation, not generally available, which is necessary to making
the decision. Whenever either special expertise or information
have been part of the decision-making process, it is probable
that a court would be unable to make a decision which would be
any better, if indeed as good, or to evaluate correctly the deci-
sion which was initially made by the official.52 At some point
judicial interference with executive or legislative decisions be-
comes violative of the separation of powers. 53 It seems likely
49. See Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 Mci. L.
REv. 201, 208 (1956).
50. E.g., Almw. STAT. § 466.06 (1965) (municipality may insure
against liability of municipality, officers, employees, and agents);
AMN. STAT. § 466.07 (1965) (municipality may indemnify officers and
employees).
51. Jaffee, supra note 38, at 233. However, this effect would
appear to be quite limited since, realisticaliy, only repeating offenders
are likely to be concerned.
52. The second guess of a court in a damages suit is about as
likely to be wrong in an absolute sense as the first guess of the
Federal Reserve Board in adjusting interest rates or of the
President and the State Department in conducting foreign rela-
tions. Much business of governmental units is beyond the
competence of the courts.
K. DAvis, supra note 2, at 799.
53. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27 (1953); Coates v.
United States, 181 F.2d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1950); DAvis, supra note 2, at
19681 1055
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that Congress, when considering passage of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, recognized a danger of judicial encroachment 4 into
the spheres of the other branches of government. Primarily in
order to prevent such encroachment, Congress drafted the two-
fold exclusion of claims based either on the officer's execution of
a regulation or statute or on the exercise of a discretionary func-
tion. The Minnesota statute contains the same two exceptions,
albeit in separate sections.55 Although no legislative history is
available for the state section, arguably it was either incorporated
for the same reasons advanced by Congress, or was uncritically
adopted together with the rest of the Federal Act.
IV. TBE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC
Any cost imposed by governmental activity in the form of an
injury to a member of society which is not paid by the govern-
ment will obviously be borne by the person injured. As govern-
mental activities increase in scope, the opportunities for injury
increase, thereby making the need for compensation more
acute. 6 Governmental liability for injury resulting from gov-
ernment activity is not a novel concept. In fact, it has even
been suggested that the government should compensate all ex-
traordinary losses or injuries suffered by individuals.57 Regard-
less of whether one accepts the insurance theory implicit in
the concept of governmental liability without fault, there are
strong policy reasons why individuals should not bear the loss
where the government is clearly at fault. Such interests are
partially recognized by the legislature through these statutes
which subject the government to liability in many situations.
A traditional function of civil liability for negligence is to
supply a sanction which encourages care appropriate to the needs
793; B. WYmAN, AnmvmsTRATnm LAw 130 (1903).
In New York, the state has waived immunity without expressly re-
serving a discretionary exception. However, several courts have held
that the need for the "separation of powers" is a defense. See Weiss v.
Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960); Comment,
26 ALBANY L. Rnv. 75 (1962).
54. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
55. MINx. STAT. §§ 466.03(5), 466.03(6) (1965).
56. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 6, at 170; Nutting, Legislative
Practice Regarding Tort Claims Against the State, 4 Mo. L. REV. 1
(1939); Note, Municipal Tort Liability, Purchase of Liability Insurance
as Waiver of Immunity, 18 Wyo. L.J. 220, 225 (1964); Comment, 21 OHIo
ST. L.J. 648 (1960).
57. See 13orchard, Government Liability in Tort, 28 CoLum. L. REv.
577, 741 (1928) (pts. 7-8); Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 6, at 169.
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of society and the circumstances of the case.5 s Therefore, where
governmental immunity has had the effect of encouraging lax-
ness and a disregard of potential harm, exposure of the govern-
ment to liability for its torts will have the effect of increasing
governmental care and concern for the welfare of those who
might be injured by its actions.5 9 This increased concern would
cause government officials to evaluate proposed activities in light
of their total costs, both those paid directly and those paid in-
directly in the form of compensation for injuries to individual
members of society. Otherwise stated, government liability
forces the official to balance the total social utility of the action
undertaken against the total risks and costs to society. The gov-
ernment will thus be encouraged to take the course which is
ultimately the most economical to society.60 Since the risk of
loss arising out of governmental activity is, in a real sense, a cost
of such governmental activity, such loss should not be borne
by the individual upon whom it chances to fall, but by society
generally which benefits from the activity.6 '
The foregoing value premise is explicitly recognized, at
least with respect to real and personal property rights, in the
fifth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions against public tak-
ing of private property without just compensation. Govern-
mental imposition of a risk of damage or loss is very similar to
public taking under the laws of eminent domain.6 2 The differ-
ence between the decision to take private property and the
decision to impose a risk of damage to property is a matter of
degree; the decision to take private property can be analogized to
the imposition of a one hundred per cent risk of loss of some
58. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 49 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
59. Id. at 60.
60. An example of the need for such considerations is available in
the facts of United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955). This
case involved two suits against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act to recover for flooding of land following a break in an
irrigation canal operated by the federal government. Testimony indi-
cated that the United States Reclamation Service had decided that the
construction of the canal in question would have been too expensive if
it had been lined with concrete along its entire length. 225 F.2d at 212.
The service evidently ignored the possible costs to the public if the
unlined canal should break as it did.
61. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II,
38 YALE L.J. 720 (1929); Freezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in
the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805(1930); Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 6, at 176.
62. See 3 K. DAvis, supra note 2, § 25.05; Borchard, supra note 57, at
742.
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property rights. The similarity between a taking and the im-
position of a risk is obvious when such risk is relatively certain.
But the similarity is present whenever the individual loss is,
in fact, the result of governmental activity, whatever the the-
oretical risk created. Indeed, the loss to the private individual
is as great whether his property is physically appropriated
through an outright decision to do so, or whether it is injured as a
result of a risk imposed by the government. This view is im-
plicit in the constitutions of many of the states, including Minne-
sota, which prohibit not only taking but "damaging" private
property for public use without just compensation . 3  Just as
government is required to pay for property it deliberately
takes for public purposes, government should be required to pay
for the "takings" which result from the imposition of less certain
risks which in fact result in injury. 4 The failure to do so is,
arguably, an uncompensated taking within the prohibitions of
the Federal Constitution and the provisions of nearly all state
constitutions. 65
The uncertain nature of the distinction, if any, between loss
of private property through a taking under the powers of emi-
nent domain and losses arising through governmental tort is evi-
dent in case law. Claims for either tort or a taking under
eminent domain may often be available in a situation involving
a loss to private property as a result of governmental action.66
In fact, cases in tort are sometimes lost because practitioners fail
to recognize the alternative theory of liability based on eminent
domain.6 7 The overlapping nature of eminent domain and tort
is further evidenced by the historic fact that, in order to avoid
the distasteful doctrine of sovereign immunity, courts have fre-
quently relied on the constitutional prohibitions against taking to
63. For a list of such jurisdictions, see 2 P. NicHoLs, ENU'EN
DOmAiN § 6.44 (1963).
64. See Davis, supra note 4, at 812; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note
6, at 176.
65. But see Brandenburg v. Los Angeles County Flood Control
Dist., 45 Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941) (refusing to extend concept
of eminent domain to personal injury).
66. Davis, supra note 4, at 766.
67. Id. at 767. Compare United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
339 U.S. 799 (1950) (permanent flooding held to be a taking), and
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (intermittent flooding
is taking of easement), with United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709 (9th
Cir. 1955) (damages for flooding not allowed because of failure to
prove negligence), and Thomas v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881
(W.D. Mo. 1949) (damages for flooding of land barred by discretionary
exception).
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grant recoveries when a tort theory would appear more appropri-
ate.6
Takings under eminent domain have been held to include
a wide variety of interests in property which are not, strictly
speaking, taken by the sovereign, but rather, merely destroyed as
to the owner thereof.6 9 However, eminent domain has not yet
been extended to cover personal injuries.70 Thus, if a particular
governmental activity, such as the flooding of land, results in an
injury to both property and person, the recovery for the personal
injury may be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
while that for the property may be allowed under the doctrine
of eminent domain.7 1 However, when the government under-
takes an activity which imposes risk of both property and per-
sonal injury, the arguments in favor of compelling the govern-
ment to provide compensation for the property damage are
equally applicable to the personal injury. Such governmental
liability is in line with modern developments and is implicitly
68. For a recent discussion of inverse condemnation and its rela-
tion to tort and the spreading of risks in general, see Aestyne, Moderniz-
ing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA Ct.ARA
LAW. 1 (1967).
The availability of alternative remedies and the difference of opin-
ion as to which should be applied are demonstrated in two decisions con-
cerning claims for losses to property situated adjacent to an airport.
In both United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), and Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), a glide path for an airport
passed over plaintiff's property at a low level. In Causby the noise
and landing lights from the military planes, owned and operated by
the federal government destroyed the use of the property as a chicken
farm and caused loss of sleep, nervousness, and fright to the plaintiff.
The Court held that the government had taken a property right-ease-
ment-and was constitutionally required to pay for it. Dissenting, Jus-
tice Black joined by Justice Burton argued that the facts did not con-
stitute a taking within the prohibitions of the Constitution but "at best
an action in tort where there might be recovery if the noise and light
constituted a nuisance, a violation of a statute, or were the result of
negligence." 328 U.S. at 270.
In Griggs, the noise, vibrations, and danger caused by planes
taking off and landing forced plaintiff and his family to move from
their home. The Court held that the county, which owned and operated
the airport, had taken an air easement over the property for which it
had to pay just compensation as required by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The dissent in Griggs argued that there was a taking within the
holding of Causby, but that the United States, through the supervision
and approval of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, rather than Alle-
gheny County had done the taking.
69. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945).
70. See Brandenburg v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.,
45 Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941).
71. See cases cited note 67 supra.
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recognized in the statutes which abrogate sovereign immunity.
The problem faced by the courts in interpreting the discretion-
ary exception of such statutes is to balance the interest the
public has in being protected from losses resulting from govern-
mental activity against the interests of government in being free
from such liability. Differentiation is required which will pro-
hibit judicial review of decisions requiring administrative inde-
pendence while not extending immunity further than necessary
for this purpose.72
V. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE DISCRETIONARY
EXCEPTION AND ITS INAPPLICABILITY TO
MUNICIPAL TORTS
In imposing or refusing to impose tort liability upon the
federal government, the federal courts have evidenced two re-
lated approaches: the nature of the decision itself and the level
of government at which the decision is made. The first approach
evolved to handle liability for the injurious effects of decision
making is to characterize the decisions in question as planning
decisions, those for which the government will be protected un-
der the discretionary duty exception, or operational decisions,
those for which the government will be held liable.73 The char-
acterization as planning or operational has involved an analysis
of the nature of the decision involved.7 4 While the decisions do
not lend themselves to consistent generalization, some common
characteristics are evident. Actions which have been held to
be of a planning nature have tended to be those which initiate
programs, 75 deal with general policy, or are directly and vitally
related to a governmental program or project.7 6 Illustrative of
these planning decisions have been the approval of a highway
plan by the Secretary of Commerce, 7 the decision to activate an
air base,78 a general goal of maximum freedom for mental pa-
72. James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary
Function" Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity,
10 U. FLA. L. REv. 184, 187 (1957). See notes 104-05 infra and accom-
panying text.
73. The governmental-proprietary distinction which long confused
the law of sovereign immunity has been abandoned. See note 12 supra.
74. See Smith v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1953).
75. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Sickman
v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Ch. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
939 (1951).
76. United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98, 105 (9th Cir. 1962).
77. Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1962).
78. United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962).
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tients, 70 and the decision as to whether and where to build a
post office.80 Actions held to be operational have tended to be of
a specific and detailed type, dealing with the implementation of
programs and policies. Typically, these decisions could be elimi-
nated or replaced without significantly disrupting the program
or policy. Illustrative of these are the decisions of airport tower
operators,8' the decision of whether or not to install a hand-
rail,8 2 and the decision to allow freedom to a particular mental
patient.8 3 However, the courts' characterizations of the decisions
or activities as planning or operational have not been accom-
plished solely through an analysis of the particular decision.
The courts have also given much weight to the level of the
governmental organization where the decision making or activity
in question occurred. If decisions of a detailed and specific na-
ture are made by executives or administrators situated in the
higher echelons of government, the courts have tended to treat
this fact as compelling a finding that the activity in question
was of a planning nature.8 4 In such a situation, the government
can be held liable only where there has been an unauthorized
deviation from such high level decisions.8 5 Similarly, courts
have emphasized the absence of such high level activity when
classifying decisions made at lower levels as operational.8 6 This
distinction based on the level at which the decision was made is
set forth in Dalehite v. United States:8 7
The "discretionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis for
suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initia-
79. White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1963).
80. American Exch. Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir.
1958).
81. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
82. American Exch. Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir.
1958).
83. White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1963).
84. E.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Johnston v.
District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19 (1886); Sullivan v. United States,
129 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. IlM. 1953); Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866
S.D. Iowa 1950).
This conclusion is also supported by implication in the numerous
cases which emphasize the lack of a high level decision when finding the
decision nondiscretionary. E.g., Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819(8th Cir. 1956); Sullivan v. United States, supra.
85. White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1963); Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (D.N.J. 1954); Boyce v.
United States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950); Thomas v. United
States, 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
86. See note 84 spra.
87. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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tion of programs and activities. It also includes determination
made by executives or administrators in establishing plans,
specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room
for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It neces-
sarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable.87 a
This statement indicates that the Court felt that the type of deci-
sion which requires protection is most likely to occur in the
higher levels of government.88
The fundamental difficulty with the planning-operational
approach is that it is likely to become a mere labeling approach.
This immediately creates the further problem of setting up cri-
teria for determining what activity is operational and what is
planning.8 9 As with the case of the older governmental-propri-
etary test of municipal liability, it is evident that either term
may be applied in a given situation, depending on how expan-
sively or narrowly one interprets the problem or on the re-
sult desired. Moreover, the content which has already been
given these terms in the process of applying them to the ac-
tivities of the federal government is substantially inapplicable
to the activities of a municipal government. Federal activities re-
lating to foreign relations, national defense, trade regulation, or
the setting of interest rates have no counterpart at the municipal
level. Municipal activities tend more to concern the day-to-day
affairs of the people living in the area governed and are more
closely analogous to the types of activities carried on by private
enterprise. Because of these general differences in the nature
of the activities of the two governing bodies, federal court deci-
sions made with respect to the federal government will have
little or no relevance at the municipal level.
A municipal government might, of course, make some deci-
sions similar to those which have been protected under the fed-
eral case law. However, even in these situations the federal
cases may be inappropriate. As discussed above, one of the most
important reasons for sovereign immunity is the desire to pre-
87a. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). See James, supra note 72, at 188.
88. See Davis, supra note 4, at 789; Jaffee, supra note 38, at 219.
An approach based on level has also been taken with respect to the
liability of the officers. Here a distinction has been drawn between
those of high and low rank. See Blachly & Oatman, supra note 1, at
192; Patterson, supra note 43, at 862.
89. Jayson, Application of the Dic-cretionary Function Exception,
24 Fnm. B.J. 153, 155 (1964). See Smith v. United States, 113 F. Supp.
131 (1953) (incompatible interpretations under the discretionary excep-
tion).
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serve the separation of powers. However, the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers has enjoyed a much broader application in
matters pertaining to the federal government than with respect
to municipal government. Generally speaking, a municipal gov-
ernment is not considered a sovereign government and may be
compelled to accept responsibility in tort by both the legislature
and the judiciary.90 Although the doctrine of separation of
powers may place a limit on the degree to which the federal
courts or legislature may impose liability on the executive branch
of government9' there is no similar restraint with respect to
municipal corporations. Thus, to the degree that considerations
of the separation of powers are given effect in the federal deci-
sions applying the federal discretionary duty exception, these de-
cisions are inappropriate in the application of this exception to
municipal corporations.
Furthermore, the reliance placed by the federal courts upon
the level at which a decision was made also renders federal
case law inapplicable to the municipal situation. In the first
place, it is evident that decisions of varying degrees of impor-
tance to the governmental policy and function may, in particular
instances, be made at all levels of government. Therefore, to
the extent that the level is relied upon as dispositive of the
issue, that reliance may be misplaced 92 whether it is the federal
90. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254
(1953); Blachly & Oatman, supra note 1, at 189.
It should be remembered that the Minnesota statute defines "mu-
nicipal corporations" for purposes of the statute as including those en-
tities which would normally fall within the classification quasi-corpora-
tions. As discussed above, such are extensions of the state and nor-
mally enjoy immunity coterminous with that of the state. However, as
creatures of the state legislature, it would seem that quasi-corporations
could be subjected to liability, at least by the legislature. Thus, even
with respect to quasi-corporations, the separation of powers doctrine has
less application than in the case of the federal government where the
legislature is powerless to interfere with the rights and powers of the
executive.
91. That the discretionary exception is aimed at the executive
branch is implicit in the fact that both the federal, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)
(1964), and the state, MInw. STAT. § 466.03(5) (1965), statutes contain a
separate exception which is evidently aimed at providing protection
only for the legislative branch.
92. "[L]ooking solely to the echelon of the official rather than to
the ... nature of his conduct, may be useful as a general guide ...
but seems unsound as a conclusive test .... " Jayson, supra note 89, at
154. This sentiment was evident in the minority opinion in Dalehite:
"[I]f decisions are being made at Cabinet levels as to the temperature
of bagging explosive fertilizers, . . .perhaps an increased sense of cau-
tion and responsibility even at that height would be wholesome." 346
U.S. at 58.
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government or a municipality that is involved. However, the
level of government at which a decision was made may be a
valid guide in the analysis of that decision. There is no necessary
correlation between the levels or hierarchy in the administra-
tive branch of the federal government and that of a municipal
government, nor indeed between municipal governments them-
selves. Therefore, federal cases which often rely on the level of
government, even if only as a guide to the proper decision, can
be translated into the municipal situation only in rough fashion.
Finally, there is a danger that application of the federal
cases, especially those which have found discretionary activity in
the border area of the planning-operational distinction, may
classify as discretionary those activities for which the municipal
government would have been liable under the governmental-
proprietary distinction. For example, the federal courts have
held that the decision as to whether or not an individual should
be admitted to a government hospital is discretionary and there-
fore no liability attaches.9 3 However, where a municipal hos-
pital, although nonprofit, is characterized as a revenue-producing
institution, the government has been held to be involved in a
proprietary activity and, therefore, liable for torts arising there-
from.94 In such a situation, municipal liability would probably
attach to a negligent decision concerning admission. However,
if the federal case law were applied in this instance, the effect
would be to expand rather than restrict sovereign immunity as
applied to municipalities.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, application of the federal
approach to the discretionary exception is inappropriate. To
follow decisional law would only have the effect of adding con-
fusion to the law of municipal liability in tort. Indeed, the
same reasons suggest that immunity for discretionary acts may
not be as important to municipalities as it is to the federal gov-
ernment.
VI. CRITICISM OF APPLICATION OF DISCRETIONARY
DUTY EXCEPTION TO MUNICIPALITIES
Recent years have seen a significant move away from the
93. E.g., Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950).
94. E.g., Borwege v. City of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N.W. 915
(1933). However, the operation of a hospital by a municipality may be
characterized as directed towards the preservation of public health
of indigents and, as such, it may be held to be activity of a governmen-
tal nature. See, e.g., Gillies v. City oj' Minneapolis, 66 F. Supp. 467
(D. Minn. 1946) (applying Minnesota law).
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application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the mu-
nicipality,95 as evidenced by the Minnesota statute. It is there-
fore appropriate to examine the need for the discretionary duty
exception in the context of this movement away from municipal
immunity and in light of the strong public policy favoring com-
pensation of individuals injured through municipal activity.
Since the statutes in question grant courts the power to adjudi-
cate governmental tort liability in a vast assortment of situations,
it is evident that the concern giving rise to the discretionary
exception was not that the mere imposition of liability, in itself,
would be overly destructive of the governmental interests in-
volved. Rather, the evil sought to be overcome must have been
the governmental interest involved in freeing the official from
the coercion which may be present in the imposition of liability
and in avoiding excessive violation of the separation of powers.
The first problem, the undesirable effect of the imposition
of liability in certain instances, would appear to be adequately
protected by the traditional tort requirement of foreseeability.
It is evident that the decisions made by government officials will
involve risks which range from those which are completely in-
definite and speculative to those which are, in essence, practi-
cal certainties. When the risks which inhere in a particular
governmental decision are relatively indefinite they are not sus-
ceptible to reasonable evaluation by the official making the
decision. In such instance it is difficult or impossible to balance
such uncertainty against all of the other considerations which
may be involved in a particular decision. In such a situation,
requiring the "correct" decision, under a threat of judicially im-
posed liability, might well inhibit the activity of a government
official. If government is to act, its official must be free to do
so pursuant to the best decision possible under the given cir-
cumstances. Thus, where the risks involved are speculative, it
may be necessary for an official to be free to disregard considera-
tions of these imponderables and make a decision on the basis of
more certain elements. Moreover, if the government ignores or
is unaware of the unevaluable risk, the imposition of liability
will operate to defeat governmental prediction or expectation.
From the government's point of view, the liability may alter,
perhaps drastically, the desirability of a chosen course of action.
Such result would present a substantial impediment to the gov-
95. For a comprehensive survey of the course of the law in a great
many jurisdictions, see 3 K. DAvis, TREATisE Ox ADmmmTRAT LAW
§ 25.01, at 95 (1966 Supp.).
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ernment's ability to act effectively and would be a substantial
interference by the judiciary with the functions of the other
branches of government.
An example can be drawn from the facts of Dalehite v.
United States, which involved a series of decisions ranging from
the broad policy decision to produce fertilizer with which to
aid the rebuilding of postwar Germany and Japan, to specific and
detailed plans by which to implement the program. The deci-
sion to produce fertilizer involves a great many indefinite risks,
many of which are impossible to evaluate and hence cannot be
considered along with the other factors which are a part of the
decision-making process. To require the decision maker to at-
tempt to take into consideration these imponderables might in-
deed hinder the making of the decision. Moreover, if the deci-
sion to produce and ship the fertilizer is made through consid-
eration of the evaluable factors involved, ignoring potential but
uncertain risks, the desirability of such course of action will be
substantially altered if costs which could not have been foreseen
are imposed.
On the other hand, as risks shift from the speculative to the
certain, they become increasingly susceptible to reasoned evalu-
ation. In this situation, it is possible for the officer to weigh the
risk along with the other factors involved in a particular deci-
sion. To require that they do so, just as a private individual
must with respect to possible tortious acts, would seem to be a
desirable result and would encourage the making of decisions
which do not impose unnecessary costs on society as a whole.
Moreover, it does not require officials to do that which is im-
possible and thus does not constitute unreasonable interference
with the decision making process. In addition, the government
will, presumably, have been aware of the foreseeable potential
loss when it undertook to act and the imposition of liability will
neither interfere with the original decision nor operate to defeat
the decision maker's reasonable expectations. By thus applying
traditional concepts of tort liability, the administration is not
being told that it may not make a particular decision and act
pursuant thereto. It is merely being made to pay the entire fore-
seeable costs of its activities. Again, by way of example, the
facts of Dalehite involved specific decisions as to the method of
storage, the temperature at which the fertilizer was to be pack-
aged, and other similarly detailed decisions. Such decisions in-
volved what reasonably should be regarded as fairly predictable
1066
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and substantial risks of explosion 6 When making these de-
tailed decisions, it should have been possible to evaluate such
risks in order to arrive at a decision as to the course which of-
fered the greatest utility to society as a whole. The expectations
of government would not be frustrated in such a case when it is
made to pay for the costs of the foreseeable, resulting explosions.
Thus, any undesirable effect which the imposition of liability
might have on the functioning of government would appear to
be avoided by the requirement of foreseeability since it is neces-
sary to the liability of the government as a part of the initial de-
termination that a tort in fact exists. Moreover, the imposition
of liability for foreseeable loss will have the positive benefit of
requiring government officials to consider such risks, and thereby
evaluate alternative courses of action. Therefore, it is arguable
that the exception for discretionary duties is not required in order
to protect government from the undesirable effects of the im-
position of liability for foreseeable risks. In this regard, it is
interesting to note that an examination of the federal cases re-
veals that, generally speaking, situations in which discretionary
functions have been found would probably not have involved
tort liability had the court gone on to make that determina-
tion.07 Such a fact urges the conclusion that the federal cases
are primarily concerned with the undesirability of allowing the
judiciary to become involved in an evaluation of the decision,
rather than the effects of such evaluation or the possible im-
position of liability.98
Since both the federal and Minnesota statutes impose liabil-
ity in many instances, and thus will subject many decisions to
judicial evaluation, it is evident that only with respect to cer-
96. The minority in Dalehite evidently felt that the dangers of
explosion should have been foreseen. See 346 U.S. at 55 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
97. For example, it would require an extraordinary set of circum-
stances in order to imagine liability arising solely out of the decision to
change the course of the Missouri River, Coates v. United States, 181
F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950), or the decision not to operate a seized coal
mine, Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa
1949), or a decision to conduct a survey, Dahlstrom v. United States,
228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956). However, in those decisions where the
discretionary exception has been held to apply because of the level at
which a decision occurred, liability might well be found. E.g., Dale-
hite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). This, however, does not evi-
dence a concern for the effect of judicial review or the imposition of
liability, but with the review of the decisions of high level decision
makers.
98. This is also evidenced in the legislative history of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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tain kinds of decisions is judical evaluation undesirable. More-
over, as discussed above in connection with the inapplicability
of the federal standard to the muncipality, decisions which re-
quire protection from judicial evaluation are likely to occur less
frequently at the municipal level -than at the federal level.
Neither the separation of powers nor -the high level policy nature
of the decision involved is likely to require protection in cases
involving municipal liability.99
The use of a broad term such as "discretionary duty" may be
appropriate when dealing with the great number of governmental
policy type decisions which occur at the federal level. It would
be difficult, if not impossible, to list all of the specific activities
which the term was designed to protect. In such a circum-
stance, the only practical course may well be to leave it to the
judiciary to handle specific situations on the basis of a case to
case determination.
This is not necessarily true at the municipal level. Since
the powers and duties of municipal governments are not nearly
as broad as those of the federal government, it would appear
that there would be fewer types of decisions which will re-
quire protection. The use of an exception for "discretionary func-
tions or duties" adds confusion to the law of municipal tort lia-
bility both because it is difficult to determine what is intended
to be subsumed thereunder'0 0 and because of the gloss which has
99. Neither of these factors was apparently felt to be important
under the governmental-proprietary test of municipal liability since they
could both exist in a decision concerning a proprietary activity and
liability could, nevertheless, be imposed. See notes 93 & 94 supra and
accompanying text.
100. For example, since the statutory language protects the per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty, it could be argued that these statutes are meant to protect the
nonexercise as well as the exercise of discretion. In other words, if an
official has been given the duty of making a decision between X and
Y-both being valid, governmental alterrnatives-arguably it is not nec-
essary that he actually make that decision. Injury-producing, but
immunized, governmental activity might result merely from the default
of the official who was to make the determination as to the action to be
pursued. However, the better view is that the discretion should ac-
tually have been exercised. This has been required in actions seeking
mandamus where the official must prove either that the decision was
made in the exercise of discretionary powers given him, or that, in
the exercise of the discretion given him, he decided to take no action.
See Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Actd: A Proposed Construction of
the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956).
The discretionary exception should be available not where discre-
tion merely might have been exercised, but where it was, in fact, exer-
cised. If the official has not exercised discretion, as opposed to exer-
cising it in favor of nonaction, there is no decision which requires pro-
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been put on the term as applied to the federal government.101
In order to avoid this confusion, it is submitted that the use of
terms which designate more specifically the activity which is to
be protected is desirable.
When discussing the dangers of exposing municipalities to
tort liability in all instances, examples are generally drawn from
the areas of zoning,10 2 licensing, 0 3 and legislative, quasi-legis-
lative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.10 4 The exception, con-
tained in both the federal and state statutes for acts or omis-
sions in the execution of a valid or invalid statute, charter, ordi-
nance, resolution, or other regulation by an officer or employee
exercising due care' 0 5 is obviously aimed at protecting most, if
not all, of the above municipal activities. Therefore, an additional
exception for discretionary duties would appear to be unneces-
sary and superfluous. However, if these or other interests are
not deemed sufficiently protected by the general requirements
of tort liability and the exception for legislative decisions, an
additional exception stating them specifically should be con-
tained in the statutes defining municipal tort liability.106
tection and immunity should not exist. In fact, an official's failure to
exercise discretion is inimical to the proper functioning of government
and should be discouraged. When a governmental official has been
given the duty to exercise discretion in a particular matter, if that dis-
cretion is not exercised, the government is not operating as it was
designed. In this case, neither the interests of the government nor
those of the public are being effectively pursued.
The statutory language "or the failure to perform" may have been
thought necessary in order to insure that no classification based on a
misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction would be read into the statute.
Such a test has sometimes been applied to the determination of the
liability of the officer or municipality. See Stevens v. North States
Motor, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 348, 201 N.W. 435, 436 (1925); Bolland v.
Gihlslaf, 134 Minn. 41, 42, 158 N.W. 725 (1916); Blachly & Oatman,
supra note 1, at 186. If the word "discretionary" is implied before the
phrase "failure to exercise" this interpretation becomes evident. The
discretionary exception then protects the discretionary decision to un-
dertake a particular course of action or the discretionary decision to
take no action at all.
101. See Section V supra.
102. See 3 K. DAviS, supra note 95, at 484.
103. See, e.g., Op. MINw. ATT'y GEM. 59a-32(6A) (1965) (issuance of
building permit classified as discretionary under MINN. STAT. § 466.03 (6)
(1965).
104. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130
(Fla. 1957).
105. MA -N. STAT. § 466.03 (5) (1965); 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1964).
106. Such specific exceptions are present in the Illinois Local Gov-
ernmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 85, §§ 2-102 & 2-111 (1966). But see ILL. A.iw. STAT. ch. 85,
§ 2-201 (1966) (additional exception for exercise of discretion).
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VII. CONCLUSION
There are strong public interests which urge the compensa-
tion of those individual members of society who suffer injury
through government negligence. Consistent with this policy,
municipal tort immunity should be extended no further than
is necessary to the protection of the governing process. The
federal discretionary duty exception is both inappropriate and
unnecessary at the municipal level. 0 7 Indeed, the exception only
adds confusion to the law of municipal tort liability. Therefore,
it is submitted that the legislature shiould reconsider its accept-
ance of the discretionary exception. If protection for some par-
ticular type of activity is deemed necessary, such immunity could
be supplied specifically. Moreover, if the discretionary exception
remains in the statute, any court called upon to construe it
should do so strictly,08 retaining the widest possible latitude of
municipal tort liability.
107. That the exception is unnecessary is demonstrated by the fact
that since the enactment of the statute in 1963, no decisions have re-
quired the interpretation of the discretionary function exception.
108. One step in the direction of strict construction is the require-
ment of an actual exercise of discretion rather than the mere oppor-
tunity or authority to do so. See note 100 supra.
Another approach might be to require a showing that the course
of action, in favor of which discretion was exercised, was supported by
governmental necessity or reason. See J3lyhl v. Village of Waterville,
57 Minn. 115, 58 N.W. 817 (1894), where, in a suit involving a defect in
the sidewalk, the court, focusing on the fact that there was no reason or
necessity for the defect, held the city liable.
Thus, it is not the "discretion" of a government driver to exceed
a speed limit [Sullivan v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 713 (N.D.
Ill. 1955)] or to make a left turn from the wrong lane of a
highway, [Crouse v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del.
1955) ] for there are no special considerations relating to public
policy or involving government interests in making these deci-
sions ....
Jayson, supra note 89, at 160.
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